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Faculty and Deans

JUSTICE SOUTER AND THE CIVIL RULES
SCOTT DODSON
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 30, 2009, after almost twenty years on the U.S. Supreme
Court, Justice David Hackett Souter announced his retirement.1 A quiet
personality never comfortable in the D.C. spotlight2 (except, perhaps,
during his confirmation hearings3), Justice Souter was rarely characterized
as a force on the Court.4 No doubt his legacy will be marked in large
part—and perhaps unfairly—by his membership in the Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey5 troika and his
apparent Blackmun-like slide while on the Court from conservative to
liberal (at least, as relative to the Court as a whole).6
Despite his momentous contribution to Casey and the role that that
case has played,7 we ought to be wary of remembering Justice Souter only
as a co-author of that single case, a Republican disappointment, or a liberal
savior. He did, after all, write 326 opinions while on the Supreme Court8
(and lent an often crucial vote to hundreds more), including memorable
 Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. An early draft of this paper
was selected for presentation at the Junior/Senior Faculty Workshop on Judges and Judging at
American University Washington College of Law. Many thanks for comments received there. Special
thanks to Steve Burbank and Mark Killenbeck for insightful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Justice Souter to Retire, NPR.ORG, Apr. 30, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103694193.
2. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Unbound, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at WK1.
3. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, DAVID HACKETT SOUTER: TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN ON THE
REHNQUIST COURT, at ix (2005) (calling Souter‘s performance before the Judiciary Committee
―masterful‖); id. at 129–39, 142.
4. Some have gone so far as to call him ―mediocre.‖ See Todd Zywicki, Justice Souter and
Accidents of History, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://volokh.com/posts/1241470524.shtml (May 4,
2009, 4:55 PM) (―I don‘t think that anyone would champion Souter as a [sic] anything other than a
mediocre Justice. . . . Souter is by any measure a weak link on the Court most would think.‖); cf. Orin
Kerr, A Different Take on Justice Souter, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://volokh.com/posts/
1241474985.shtml (May 4, 2009, 6:09 PM) (disagreeing with the term ―mediocre‖ but admitting that
―he is not a great writer: His opinions don‘t ‗sing‘‖).
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. See YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at x–xi, 190; Greenhouse, supra note 2, at WK6; cf. CONG.
QUARTERLY, THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 204–05 (1990) (documenting Justice Blackmun‘s
similar movement).
7. See generally Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the
Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1322 (2009) (recounting the importance of Casey and arguing
that the case ―significantly settled the abortion dispute‖).
8. This figure was calculated using the Boolean search (―souter, j., filed‖ ―souter, j., delivered‖)
in WestLaw‘s SCT database.
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opinions in areas of constitutional criminal law,9 equal protection,10 the
First Amendment,11 and federalism.12 Even in the relatively apolitical
world of federal procedure, Justice Souter left an impression. He wrote
extensively on the Federal Arbitration Act,13 voiced thoughtful views on
the doctrine of standing,14 and moved the law forward in the areas of
preemption15 and federal question jurisdiction.16
We should, therefore, consider more of Justice Souter in commenting
on his legacy. I will not attempt a comprehensive look—I leave that for
the biographers and Court-watchers. But I will strive to offer a different
view of Justice Souter, one that is itself admittedly narrow, but at least is
outside of the proverbial defining moments and thus provides, perhaps, an
enriching perspective. I focus on Justice Souter‘s views on the federal civil
rules.17
Justice Souter appears to have shied away from writing opinions that
addressed the civil rules for most of his tenure on the Court. The first
opinion he wrote—either for the Court or for himself—that directly
addressed a federal civil rule was Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,18 issued
almost a decade after he joined the Court. Over the next eight years, he
authored only one other opinion on the civil rules, dissenting in Mayle v.
9. See generally Scott P. Johnson, The Judicial Behavior of Justice Souter in Criminal Cases
and the Denial of a Conservative Counterrevolution, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 1 (2008).
10. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Heather K. Gerken, Justice Souter
and the Voting Rights Act, BALKINIZATION, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/justice-souter-andvoting-rights-act.html (May 5, 2009, 2:17 PM) (arguing that Souter‘s legacy is tied to his voting rights
jurisprudence).
11. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting); 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting); Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
15. See, e.g., Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006); Am. Ins. Ass‘n v. Garamendi,
539 U.S. 396 (2003).
16. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
17. I use the term ―civil rules‖ to refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
noncriminal rules in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. I might also include noncriminal rules
in the Federal Rules of Evidence as well, but, alas, Justice Souter wrote no independent opinions
specifically addressing them.
18. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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Felix.19 After mid-2007, however, Justice Souter showed considerably
more willingness to write on the civil rules. In the span of a little over two
years, he authored the blockbuster pleadings case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly;20 a passionate dissent in Bowles v. Russell;21 and a dissent in
Twombly‘s equally important progeny, Ashcroft v. Iqbal.22
A survey of these five opinions by Justice Souter reveals that he is not
uniformly historicist, textualist, formalist, instrumentalist, pragmaticist, or
minimalist when it comes to the civil rules. It does, however, manifest a
commitment to construing the civil rules in a way that would treat litigants
fairly in court.23
To be sure, there are many different conceptions of procedural
fairness. One Justice‘s fairness may be another‘s folly. My aim is not to
define and evaluate the merits of Justice Souter‘s somewhat ad hoc
conception of individualized procedural fairness here (which might be
quite different than, say, Justice Scalia‘s conception of fairness as
discretion-limiting rules or, perhaps, Justice Breyer‘s conception of
systemic fairness through pragmatism); rather, I aim to show only that he
was committed to his particular version of it.
That commitment manifests itself most clearly through the words that
Justice Souter chose to explain his reasoning in these cases.24 In each one,
19. 545 U.S. 644 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also wrote for the Court in Roell
v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003), which construed the power of magistrate judges in civil cases under
28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
20. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
21. 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
22. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also authored a lone
concurrence and dissent in Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008) (Souter, J.,
concurring & dissenting), but his opinion was but a paragraph that agreed in significant part with the
Court‘s opinion and disagreed only with the outright reversal by the Court instead of vacating and
remanding.
23. I surveyed only opinions that Justice Souter authored, not those that he silently joined. No
doubt, a Justice‘s votes may represent his views just as well as his pen, but silent votes can also be
misleading; just because a Justice joins an opinion does not mean that he joins all aspects of that
opinion. It would be difficult to tell when a silent vote was an endorsement of the opinion‘s procedural
philosophy and when it was motivated by other factors. Discerning that likely would depend upon a
comparison to the Justice‘s authored opinions, so one might as well start with the authored opinions.
24. Those words are important—he largely wrote his own opinions and, by all accounts, chose
his words deliberately. See YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at 68, 160; see also Kerr, supra note 4
(―[Justice Souter‘s] words are 100% his own.‖). As a light-hearted example, Justice Souter used the
word ―nub‖ thirteen times in twelve different opinions during his tenure on the Court. By contrast, in
the entire history of the Court, all other justices have used it in only fifty-seven opinions. Of course,
authored opinions may not wholly reflect a Justice‘s views if, for example, the author tempered his
views to secure a majority, to comport with stare decisis, or for an underlying public purpose.
Although I believe, as I explain more fully below, that Justice Souter‘s commitment to the fair
treatment of litigants under the civil rules is reliable, I acknowledge that these other motivating factors
could have played a role.
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he consistently expressed that commitment in a variety of contexts,
including concern for the fair treatment of unrepresented class members,
pro se plaintiffs, parties relying on judicial decrees, defendants seeking to
avoid burdensome discovery, and plaintiffs seeking access to civil justice.
In short, Justice Souter‘s own words show his deep commitment to the fair
procedural treatment of individual litigants in our civil justice system.
II. JUSTICE SOUTER‘S CIVIL RULES OPINIONS
Each of Justice Souter‘s five major opinions implicating the civil
rules—Ortiz, Mayle, Bowles, Twombly, and Iqbal—shows his concern for
the fair treatment of civil litigants.
A. Ortiz
In Ortiz,25 that concern was for absent class members faced with
inadequate representation and the inability to opt out of the resulting
settlement of their claims. Ortiz involved the certification of an asbestos
class action submitted for settlement approval. The settlement was
negotiated in the midst of the asbestos litigation crisis—hundreds of
thousands of potential claimants existed, and asbestos manufacturers did
not have the funds to pay all of the claims. Just a few years previously, in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Court had acknowledged the crisis
and pleaded for a pragmatic legislative solution,26 but that did not happen,
and the crisis came to the Court again in Ortiz.
In Ortiz, the parties agreed to a settlement, whereby the principal
defendant, Fibreboard (which was on the verge of bankruptcy), would
fund a trust to process and pay class members‘ asbestos claims, but the
entitlements would be substantially limited.27 Fibreboard‘s looming
insolvency and the need for an end to the asbestos crisis might have
prompted some, such as Justice Breyer, to overlook some protections to
unnamed class members in order to resolve the crisis pragmatically.28
But Justice Souter would not. Vacating the settlement order, Justice
Souter held that the class action failed to meet the requirements of a socalled ―limited fund‖ class under Rule 23(b)(1) because the settlement
fund was limited by agreement rather than external factors. He expressed
25.
26.
27.
28.

Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628–29 (1997).
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 827, 850, 852.
See id. at 867 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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concern that the fund was limited not by necessity, but by conflicted class
counsel, to the detriment of the unnamed class members, who could not
opt out of a biased settlement. In addition, fairness to the unnamed class
members, who can neither opt out nor have their voices heard throughout
the settlement negotiation process, required heightened attention to
Rule 23(a)‘s structural due process protections, which the Ortiz settlement
did not meet.29
Justice Souter‘s opinion is meticulous, and its jurisprudence is varied.
In places, he is traditionalist, hewing closely to the historical model of a
―limited fund‖ in assessing its scope.30 In others, he is originalist,
conforming to the meaning that Rule 23 had at its adoption.31 In still
others, he is a dutiful follower of precedent, namely Amchem.32 Overall, he
is shockingly un-pragmatic. Unlike Justice Breyer, who—in dissent—
suggested that he might relax the strictures of Rule 23 to deal with the
crisis pragmatically, Justice Souter‘s opinion adheres rigidly to Rule 23
and the rulemaking process that produced it.33
But, tellingly, what underlay his formalism was a deep concern for
unnamed class members and the overall fairness of the class litigation. He
was skeptical of the class representatives‘ and counsels‘ assertions without
a more thorough independent scrutiny of the fund and its fairness to all of
the class plaintiffs.34 As he wrote, ―[W]e are not free to dispense with the
safeguards that have protected mandatory class members . . . .‖35
B. Mayle
Mayle v. Felix36 showed Justice Souter‘s conception of fairness in a
different light—as a concern for pro se litigants. The issue in Mayle was
whether Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
habeas petitioner to add an untimely claim to a petition that originally was
filed timely. That issue was implicated by convicted felon Jacoby Felix,
who filed, pro se, a timely civil habeas petition, alleging a violation of the
29. Id. at 838, 848–49 (majority opinion).
30. Id. at 842 (―The prudent course . . . is to presume that when subdivision (b)(1)(B) was
devised to cover limited fund actions, the object was to stay close to the historical model.‖).
31. Id. at 861 (―The nub of our position is that we are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood
it upon its adoption . . . .‖).
32. Id. at 861–64.
33. Id. at 858; id. at 861 (―[W]e are not free to alter it except through the process prescribed by
Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.‖).
34. Id. at 857 & n.31.
35. Id. at 862.
36. 545 U.S. 644 (2005).
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Sixth Amendment‘s Confrontation Clause.37 Three months before the
expiration of the habeas statute‘s one-year time limit,38 the district court
appointed him counsel. Five months after the time limit, and before any
responsive pleading to his Confrontation Clause petition had been served,
Felix‘s counsel filed an amended petition, adding a new claim for a
violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.39 Felix
argued that Rule 15(c), which applies to habeas petitions generally,40
allowed that claim to ―relate[] back‖ to the time of the original petition
because it ―arose out of the [same] conduct, transaction, or occurrence‖ as
the original pleading.41
The Court disagreed and held that Felix‘s amendment could not relate
back because the grounds for relief were supported by facts that differed in
both time and type from his timely Sixth Amendment claim. Therefore, his
Fifth Amendment claim was time-barred by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act‘s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations.42
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, suggested that
text, congressional intent, and precedent all supported a contrary view,
although he stated that none of these provided a sure answer.43 He also
noted, but did not rely on, a purposive argument: because statutes of
limitations are designed to provide predictability and finality to those who
may face claims, the filing of one habeas claim within the statute of
limitations ought to lift the statute for all habeas claims by the same
petitioner, for the state is already on notice and must defend the underlying
decision.44
Instead, what seemed to be the deciding factor for Justice Souter was
―the unfortunate consequence that the Court‘s view creates an unfair
disparity between indigent habeas petitioners and those able to afford their
37. Id. at 648.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006).
39. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 648–49.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006) (providing that habeas petitions ―may be amended . . . as provided
in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions‖); see also R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES 11
(permitting the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in habeas cases unless inconsistent
with statute or the habeas rules).
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(1)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(2) (repealed 2007).
42. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. The Court characterized Felix‘s Fifth Amendment claim as a pretrial
violation that was temporally and factually distinct from his trial-based Confrontation Clause claim. Id.
at 660–61. In effect, the Court restricted Rule 15(c)(2) to claims united by a ―common core of
operative facts.‖ Id. at 659 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. at 668 & n.2, 670–74 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 667 (―The text alone does not
tell us the answer. . .‖); id. at 676 n.9 (asserting that the text is ―ambiguous‖).
44. Id. at 666.
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own counsel.‖45 Noting that most habeas petitioners file their initial
petitions pro se and that judges likely will not appoint counsel until after
the AEDPA deadline has run, Justice Souter reasoned that the Court‘s
view handicapped appointed counsel‘s professional judgment in adding
additional claims, a handicap that a habeas petitioner represented at the
outset would not face: ―The rule the Court adopts today may not make
much difference to prisoners with enough money to hire their own
counsel; but it will matter a great deal to poor prisoners who need
appointed counsel to see and plead facts showing a colorable basis for
relief.‖46
In sum, Justice Souter‘s consequentialist construction of Rule 15
stemmed from his concern for the fair treatment of unrepresented habeas
petitioners. ―[T]he real consequences of today‘s decision‖ he intoned,
―will fall most heavily on the shoulders of indigent habeas petitioners who
can afford no counsel without the assistance of the court.‖47
C. Bowles
In Ortiz and Mayle, Justice Souter‘s concern for the fair treatment of
individual litigants was mixed with a variety of other interpretative and
jurisprudential heuristics. But in Bowles v. Russell,48 his concern was front
and center.
Keith Bowles was convicted by an Ohio jury of murder and received a
sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment. After exhausting his state
appeals, Bowles timely filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was
denied. Bowles failed to appeal the district court‘s denial within the
deadline and instead moved to reopen the time to appeal under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). On
February 10, 2004, the district court granted Bowles‘s motion and
reopened the time to appeal, giving Bowles until February 27 to file his
notice of appeal. Bowles filed his notice of appeal on February 26.
Although timely under the district court‘s order, the notice of appeal was
untimely under the rule and statute, which allow reopened time periods to
persist for only fourteen days. Consequently, the State moved to dismiss
the appeal as untimely. Bowles argued that his untimeliness should be
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 665.
Id. at 676.
Id. at 675.
551 U.S. 205 (2007).
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excused for justifiable reliance on the district court‘s order, but the court
of appeals agreed with the State and dismissed the appeal.49
The Supreme Court affirmed, largely on the basis of precedent. The
Court cited a string of cases dating back to 1848 and stated, ―This Court
has long held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is
‗mandatory and jurisdictional.‘‖50 Because the time deadline was
jurisdictional, it could not be excused for the reasons proffered by
Bowles.51
In dissent, Justice Souter did not dispute this long-historical treatment.
Instead, he focused on the particularly unfair consequences to Bowles in
this case, as the opening of his dissent explains: ―It is intolerable for the
judicial system to treat people this way, and there is not even a technical
justification for condoning this bait and switch.‖52 He continued later, ―We
have the authority to recognize an equitable exception to the 14-day limit,
and we should do that here, as it certainly seems reasonable to rely on an
order from a federal judge.‖53
Justice Souter concluded his dissent the same way he began it—
bemoaning the unfairness of strictly applying the terms of Rule 4 to
Bowles: ―As a member of the Federal Judiciary, I cannot help but think
that reliance on our orders is reasonable. I would also rest better knowing
that my innocent errors will not jeopardize anyone‘s rights unless
absolutely necessary.‖54
D. Twombly and Iqbal
If Bowles was the most forceful voicing of Justice Souter‘s concern for
the fair treatment of civil litigants, it was not the last. Ashcroft v. Iqbal55
and its forebear, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly56—together the biggest
pleadings cases in fifty years—show Justice Souter‘s commitment to fair
treatment at its most balanced.
In Twombly, two plaintiffs filed a class action complaint on behalf of
all subscribers of local telephone or high-speed internet services against
49. Id. at 207.
50. Id. at 209.
51. Id. at 213–14. For a criticism of this conclusion, see Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v.
Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631 (2008).
52. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 215 (Souter, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 220.
54. Id. at 220 n.7 (citation omitted).
55. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
56. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

2010]

JUSTICE SOUTER AND THE CIVIL RULES

297

local exchange carriers for antitrust conspiracies, in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act.57 They alleged the conspiracy solely on grounds of
conscious parallel conduct.58 The defendants moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because, they argued,
conscious parallel conduct is not itself illegal—the plaintiff must prove
more than that in order to be entitled to relief.
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, agreed that the complaint should
be dismissed because it failed to meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8‘s
requirement that the allegations ―show[] that the pleader is entitled to
relief.‖59 In the process, he placed new gloss on Rule 8:
While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, . . .
a plaintiff‘s obligation to provide the ―grounds‖ of his entitlement to
relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level . . . .60
This gloss has come to be known as the ―plausibility standard‖ of
Rule 8,61 and the plaintiffs in Twombly did not meet it.62
In creating the plausibility standard, Justice Souter only casually relied
upon Rule 8‘s textual requirement of ―showing‖ entitlement to relief and
instead focused more on prior gloss contained in the 1957 case Conley v.
Gibson, which required pleaders to allege the ―grounds‖ of their claims.63
But in the same breath, Justice Souter interred other language from Conley
that would have undermined dismissal in Twombly.64
Justice Souter‘s real motivation for the plausibility standard was
protecting defendants from burdensome discovery in meritless cases.
―[A]ntitrust discovery can be expensive,‖ he asserted, and therefore ―a
district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in
pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to
proceed.‖65
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).
58. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550, 554.
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
60. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
61. See Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV.
IN BRIEF 135, 136 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf.
62. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57.
63. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
64. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (―retir[ing]‖ Conley‘s famous ―no set of facts‖ language).
65. Id. at 558.
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In dissent, Justice Stevens pointed to the ability of a district judge to
control discovery costs and oversee the discovery process if allegations are
weak,66 but Justice Souter responded that such judicial supervision is
inadequate:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the
discovery process through careful case management, given the
common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking
discovery abuse has been on the modest side. . . . [T]he threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle
even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably,
then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the
level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no
reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal
relevant evidence.67
Unlike Ortiz, Twombly is nonoriginalist and pragmatic, looking to the
problems of modern complex litigation and trying to solve them without
resort to the rulemaking process.68 But the two cases do share a common
thread. Just as Ortiz was an attempt to ensure fairness to unnamed class
members, Twombly‘s plausibility standard is designed to protect
defendants from unfair discovery costs in near-frivolous litigation.
But it is impossible to fully understand Justice Souter in Twombly
without considering his dissent in its progeny, Iqbal, and consideration of
that case along with Twombly makes Justice Souter‘s position clear. His
position in the two cases represents the two sides of the fairness debate on
pleadings. Iqbal69 involved a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint
by a federal detainee against John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General
of the United States, and Robert Mueller, the Director of the FBI. The
complaint alleged that these defendants adopted an unconstitutional policy
that subjected plaintiff Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement on
account of his race, religion, or national origin. The defendants raised the
66. Id. at 593–95 & 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 559 (majority opinion) (internal citations, alterations, and quotations omitted).
68. My thanks to Steve Burbank for raising this point. I note, as well, that this nonoriginalist
approach was, perhaps, uncharacteristic of Justice Souter. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Justice Souter’s
Conservatism, ACSBLOG, http://www.acslaw.org/node/13546 (June 9, 2009, 12:07 PM) (―Make no
mistake: The best originalist on the Supreme Court is not Antonin Scalia or Clarence Thomas, but
David Souter.‖).
69. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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defense of qualified immunity and moved to dismiss for failure to meet the
pleading strictures of Rule 8, as interpreted by Twombly.70
The Court held that Twombly‘s plausibility standard applies
transsubstantively to all claims, including Iqbal‘s. Further, the Court held
that conclusory factual allegations are not entitled to deference at the
motion to dismiss stage—that, instead, they may be ignored. Under these
standards, the Court held that Iqbal had failed to state a claim because his
nonconclusory factual allegations did not plausibly suggest that the
defendants acted with a discriminatory motive.71
Dissenting, Justice Souter disagreed with the Court‘s decision in two
ways that are important to my claim here. First, he disagreed with the
Court‘s limited view of Iqbal‘s allegations. The Court discarded most of
Iqbal‘s allegations as conclusory and thus not entitled to a presumption of
truth. Justice Souter, on the other hand, believed that the complaint as a
whole presented a plausible claim for relief.72 As such, the satisfaction of
the plausibility standard adequately protected the defendants against the
unfair litigation costs that so concerned him in Twombly.
Second, Justice Souter would have accepted, for purposes of motions
to dismiss, the concessions made by the defendants as to the legal scope of
the relief available. Ashcroft and Mueller had conceded that their liability
could stem from a supervisor‘s knowledge of a subordinate‘s
unconstitutional conduct and deliberate indifference to that conduct. The
Court nevertheless took the issue sua sponte and decided to the contrary.73
But Justice Souter would have accepted the concession, at least out of
fairness to Iqbal. He wrote:
Finally, the Court‘s approach is most unfair to Iqbal. He was
entitled to rely on Ashcroft and Mueller‘s concession, both in their
petition for certiorari and in their merits briefs, that they could be
held liable on a theory of knowledge and deliberate indifference. By
overriding that concession, the Court denies Iqbal a fair chance to
be heard on the question.74

70. Id. at 1944.
71. Id. at 1951–52.
72. Id. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1956.
74. Id. at 1957; see also id. at 1958 n.2 (―[I]ts approach is even more unfair to Iqbal . . . for Iqbal
had no reason to argue the (apparently dispositive) supervisory liability standard in light of the
concession.‖).
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Thus, Justice Souter‘s commitment to fair treatment of the litigants—
indeed, for both the plaintiff and the defendants in Iqbal—was critical to
his opinion.
III. SOME THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS
As I have highlighted above, Justice Souter‘s concern for the fair
treatment of litigants animated his civil rules opinions. That concern
protected unnamed and ill-represented class members from a potentially
unfair settlement, tried to provide habeas petitioners with fair
representation of counsel, insisted that the appellate timing rules not
condone a judicial bait and switch, protected defendants from bearing
unfair discovery burdens associated with truly meritless cases, and would
have held that plaintiffs opposing motions to dismiss be entitled to rely
upon concessions made by defendants about the right to relief.
Of course, a robust concern for the fair treatment of civil litigants is
not the only concern or philosophy that Justice Souter espouses in those
opinions. He is not so one-faceted, and I do not claim that Justice Souter is
only concerned with procedural fairness to civil litigants. To the contrary,
Justice Souter also exhibited textualist, historicist, pragmaticist,
minimalist, activist, deferential, and formalist approaches to the civil rules,
though he did not employ any of them consistently.
But a common strand throughout all of the cases is an expressed
concern that the civil rules treat each litigant fairly. That demonstrates that
he at least is consistently concerned with procedural fairness to litigants
and that that concern is a dominant feature of his civil rules jurisprudence.
In retrospect, one might have guessed that that concern would be
apparent in Justice Souter‘s opinions. By all accounts, he personally
values sincerity, politeness, and professionalism, and he exhibits great
empathy for others.75 He exhibited these traits himself while on the
Supreme Court‘s bench; he consistently treated others with respect,
dignity, and politeness, especially party litigants.76 Unlike some of his
colleagues, his oral argument questioning was insistent but not aggressive
or condescending. Indeed, he seemed to have consciously avoided even
appearing to be unduly aggressive toward litigants. In one instance, for
example, while Justice Souter was a state judge, he wrote to an attorney to
apologize for what he viewed as a particularly probing set of questions
75. See YARBROUGH, supra note 3, at 13, 22, 25, 64, 127, 129, 134.
76. See id. at 54–55, 64, 155.
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during oral argument.77 It is no surprise, given the accounts of his
character, that Justice Souter would understand and take into account the
daunting challenges of civil litigation.
It also would not surprise me if other studies of Justice Souter‘s
jurisprudence resulted in the conclusion that he was committed to
procedural fairness to litigants in other areas. Indeed, my relatively narrow
claim about the civil rules, if indicative of a broader commitment by
Justice Souter, might help explain some anomalies in his jurisprudence in
other areas.
Take the criminal context, for example. Although Justice Souter was
seen as a moderately liberal justice for most of his tenure on the Court, the
one area in which he was described as moderately conservative was
criminal cases. But Justice Souter was most likely to side with a criminal
defendant on procedural issues that affected the defendant‘s fair trial than
on substantive issues.78 It does not seem unlikely that the motivation to
ensure fair treatment to civil litigants would also motivate Justice Souter to
construe criminal procedural rules in the same vein.
Further studies will be necessary to flesh out a holistic picture of
Justice Souter.79 But, for now, these federal civil rules cases provide
evidence of his commitment to the civil rules‘ fair treatment of litigants.
They sketch the outline of Justice Souter, Proceduralist.
77. See id. at 118.
78. See id. at 92, 234–37.
79. One other commentator has noted Justice Souter‘s commitment to the fair treatment of
litigants, relying upon non-civil-rules decisions in his early years on the Court. See Liang Kan,
Comment, A Theory of Justice Souter, 45 EMORY L.J. 1373 (1996).

